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Abstract 
This dissertation examines, within the operational framework of state sovereignty and national 
interest, the transformation of cyberspace in the 21st century. Focusing on the rising trend of 
conflictual interests being promulgated progressively into the cyber sphere, this dissertation 
parses that cyberspace has well and truly transformed into a battlefield increasingly employed 
and manipulated by both state and non-state actors. This tactic is unveiled in the way States 
have been forced to adapt to this new reality by building new capabilities and frameworks. 
States by focusing on the employment of state sovereignty and national interest principles, this 
dissertation examines how those aforementioned principles are operationalized in specific  
national and supranational paradigms. 
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1. Sovereignty 
1.1 Introduction  
The genesis of international relations theories goes hand in hand with the birth of the 
sovereign state. Marxism treats the state as one of the actors in the international system, 
whereas pluralism accepts the fact that the state is the most important actor in the international 
system. Realism goes even further by having the state acknowledged as the sole factor in the 
international system. (Kouskouvelis, 2007) 
 The state has proven its endurance as not only the highest form of social organization, 
but also as a very effective and popular one, if one is to gauze the sheer number of States that 
joined the ranks of the United Nations from its establishment in 1945 (51) to over 190 Member-
States nowadays. This does not speak so much of the United Nations ability to draw into its 
embrace States but rather showcases the reality of an international system which is built upon 
and defined by the States that form it. (Kouskouvelis, 2007) 
 A fundamental element of the modern notion of States is sovereignty, understood as a 
tendentially absolute prerogative of an autonomous and fully empowered collective. Scholars 
(Núñez, 2013) have questioned the validity of this absoluteness in practice, but it is still 
undeniable that modern political theory (and state building) is very much in debt with this 
theoretical absoluteness. It is thus that the concept of sovereignty is of paramount importance 
for explaining the functions of the international system. 
 A well-accepted definition of sovereignty is provided by the Island of Palmas (United 
States vs the Netherlands) arbitral award of 1928. It is stated that: “Sovereignty in the relations 
between States signifies independence. Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the 
right to exercise, therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of a State.” 
 
1.2 Evolution of the concept of sovereignty 
 Suffice to say that a traditional approach to sovereignty understands the same as 
European 18th century ancient regimes looked at the new constitutions: were they a simple 
gracious concession of an authority whose ultimate source of legitimation is not questioned 
(and that as such could be taken back in any moment), or were they the seal of a new normative 
order recognizing citizens (and humans after 1948) as the original bearers of sovereignty? The 
first theorist of the concept of sovereignty, Jean Bodin, used the concept as a way to enforce 
the power of the French monarchs. In Bodin’s work “De Republica” (1576) in which he studies 
the concept of sovereignty (souverainete), he emphasizes the importance of the concept of the 
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supreme authority (summa potestas), is not subjugated to any other kind of authority. This 
supreme authority, personified in themonarch was granted with the right to draft, interpret and 
enforce laws without being subjected to the control of any other form of human power. Since 
he is not controlled by anyone, according to Bodin he is “absolutus”, thus subject only to the 
laws of the monarchy, God and natural law. (Kouskouvelis, 2007) 
 Even though the definition of sovereignty given by Bodin in the 16th Century was 
broadly adopted by other writers, most of them disagreed with specific points of Bodin's theory, 
by supporting that a law or a constitution could limit sovereignty. Then, in the 17th century 
Thomas Hobbes took Bodin's theory one step further, by formulating the opinion that 
sovereignty was not subject or limited by anything (Snyman-Ferreira, 2006). Thomas Hobbes 
in his work “Leviathan” (1651) will eliminate the reference to the metaphysical commitments. 
The “sovereign” is absolute, in the sense that even if he oversteps his authority he is not held 
accountable, since he is the reason for the formation of the state, the elimination of the natural 
state situation, or as Hobbes calls it "war of all against all" (bellum omnium contra omnes), and 
the safeguarding of life and property for every man (Kouskouvelis, 2007). In his work, Hobbes, 
clearly states that sovereignty is superior to every other right, even that of religion (Snyman-
Ferreira, 2006). One can conclude that, in Hobbes’ work, the concept of sovereignty is a legal 
and political notion that allows the ruler to proceed with decision making processes, in the 
highest level, without any internal or external restrictions (Kouskouvelis, 2007). 
 The term “state” in the late 16th century defined a sovereign authority that was applied 
to an entire people in a territorially defined area. From this time begins a search (philosophical, 
theoretical) of the nature of state sovereignty and the means used for its exercise. The 
culmination of these theoretical and political pursuits was the liberal state itself and the 
assumption that power is exercised through the law and remains subordinate to it. In other 
words, a definition of the state under these parameters is understanding the, state as the 
supreme, sovereign power applied to an entire people in a defined territory (according to the 
law) (Kouskouvelis, 2007). 
 The concept of sovereignty, although it was originally conceived in order to support the 
power within the emerging countries and to abolish the control of the monarch or of the 
remaining feudal lords, was soon utilized to pit one state power against another (sovereign) 
power/party; essentially, against other States. In this juncture of the discussion, it is no longer 
about the dominant, supreme power within a state but the sovereign state itself. The state is 
sovereign because it decides on its own, without being under pressure and without being 
influenced by external factors (Kouskouvelis, 2007). 
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 This paved the way to Constitutional Law and state theory, and added sovereignty to 
the arsenal of International Law and International Relations. To sum up, in international law 
each state consists of a population (people) who reside in a given space (territory) on which 
(people and territory) one sovereign power is exercised. Sovereignty is a property featuring 
unique States and is absolute and exclusive: There is within the state of this superior power, 
while at the same time the state excludes any influence or interference from any outside body 
inside (Kouskouvelis, 2007). 
 
1.3 The Four concepts of Sovereignty 
 One of the most influential texts on the concept of sovereignty is Stephen Krasner's 
Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy. In his text Krasner (1999) elaborates on four concepts of 
sovereignty, namely: 
1. Domestic Sovereignty, 
2. Interdependence Sovereignty, 
3. International legal sovereignty and 
4. Westphalian sovereignty. 
Sovereignty is a multifaceted concept which expresses itself predominantly in 4 different 
manners according to Krasner (1999). As Ferreira-Snyman (2006) summarizes, the first 
manner in which sovereignty is expressed is domestically (domestic sovereignty). It largely 
regards the level of enjoyment a state has to exercise its own power and the domestic 
organization of power. Second, the manner in which the state can exercise control relationally 
(interdependence sovereignty), i.e. border controls. Third, the legal status enjoyed by the state 
internationally (international legal sovereignty). Last, but not least, is the aspect of the so called 
Westphalian sovereignty which regards the ability of the state to organize its political life under 
two axes: the integrity of its territoriality and the ability to structure itself without outside 
influences. 
As Krasner (1999) notes, there is a fundamental difference between authority and 
control, and even though it is not clearly stated, it is enrooted within the usage of the terms.  
 
Authority involves a mutually recognized right for an actor to engage in 
specific kinds of activities. If authority is effective, force or compulsion would 
never have to be exercised. Authority would be coterminous with control. But 
control can be achieved simply through the use of brute force with no mutual 
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recognition of authority at all. In practice, the boundary between control and 
authority can be hazy. (Krasner 1999, 10) 
 
Litsas (2013, 47) observes that: 
 
A liberal democratic regime in not the one and only political context for the 
state’s sovereignty to arise, flourish and be maintained. Sovereignty in not 
necessarily dependent on ideological components such as those found in 
democratic regimes and liberal philosophical assumptions. Rather, it seems 
that, in any socio-political context, sovereignty functions regardless of the 
type of the political system of the state. Its form of operation is closely 
connected to the administrative, fiscal and judicial qualities of the state, as 
well as to the state’s performance in the international arena, not the 
ideological facade it demonstrates to the other members of the international 
system. 
 What we observe is that sovereignty is one of the most primal concepts a state upholds, 
regardless of ideology or social structure. Sovereignty is directly connected with the state’s 
constant struggle for survival. 
 
1.4 Sovereignty and the United Nations 
 Since the foundation of the United Nations after the end of World War II, the concept 
of sovereignty has been severely changed and challenged. As it is stated in the preamble and 
in Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations, the organization’s aim is to prevent wars, 
maintain international peace and security and promote respect for human rights, as well as 
justice. In addition to all this, the United Nations, aims to facilitate international cooperation 
and provides for the use of collective measures. 
 The first reference to the notion of sovereignty appears in Article 2(1) of the Charter of 
the United Nations. However, it does not use the term on its own, but rather in relation to States. 
Specifically, the United Nations “is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its 
members”. The principle of equality as described in Article 2(1) fully qualifies as an example 
of the Westphalian model, since this principle lawfully authorizes the current power 
relationships on the international system and formally recognizes and affirms the case that all 
States, regardless of their stature, ought to be dealt with as equivalent. Notwithstanding, the 
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presentation of the phrase sovereign equality into global law by the Charter of the United 
Nations demonstrates a critical change in the historical backdrop of the idea of state power. 
Furthermore, the Friendly Relations Declaration of 1970 states again that the principle 
of sovereign equality ensures the right of state to equality in law. As the Declaration proclaims: 
All States enjoy sovereign equality. They have equal rights and duties and are 
equal members of the international community, notwithstanding differences 
of an economic, social, political or other nature. In particular, sovereign 
equality includes the following elements: 
a. States are judicially equal; 
b. Each State enjoys the rights inherent in full sovereignty; 
c. Each State has the duty to respect the personality of other States; 
d. The territorial integrity and political independence of the State are 
inviolable; 
e. Each State has the right freely to choose and develop its political, social, 
economic and cultural systems; 
f. Each State has the duty to comply fully and in good faith with its international 
obligations and to live in peace with other States. 
It is understood, by this article of the Declaration, that the principle of sovereign 
equality integrates the notions of sovereignty and legal equality. 
The Charter of the United Nations affirms that the sovereignty of States is restricted, 
by recognizing the superiority of international law. On this matter Article 2(2) of the Charter 
reads: 
All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the right and benefits resulting 
from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them 
in accordance with the present Charter. 
In joining the principle of sovereignty with the principles that States need to abide by 
international law, the Charter of the United Nations unmistakably demonstrates that there is 
not a logical inconsistency, yet rather an association between state power and respect for 
international law. The Charter consequently affirms the preeminent idea of international law 
and portrays sovereignty as power within and subject to international law, and hence as a 
constrained notion. 
Regarding the use of force, Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations clearly 
maintains that all Member States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. The Charter 
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therefore allows the Member States to resort to force only in two cases: First, under the 
authority of the Security Council and secondly, when States exercise the right of individual or 
collective self-defense per Article 51. 
By prohibiting the use of force the Charter qualifies the classical understanding of 
sovereignty as absolute authority, which included as a key element the right to engage in  war. 
(Ferreira-Snyman, 2006) According to Fassbender the ban on the use of force by the Charter is 
today understood not so much as a limitation of sovereignty, but as a necessary prerequisite for 
a de facto enjoyment of sovereign equality by States. Therefore, a state’s sovereign equality 
depends on a comprehensive prohibition of the use of force and an effective mechanism to 
implement and enforce this prohibition. (Ferreira-Snyman, 2006) 
Last but not least, under the Charter of the United Nations the Security Council is given 
the power, under Chapter VII, to make decisions that bind all member States and allows it to 
enforce these decisions. Even though one can argue that Article 39 of the Charter directly 
contradicts the classical notion of state sovereignty by excluding the Security Council from the 
principle of non-intervention under certain circumstances, this provision allows the Security 
Council to identify whether any threat to the peace exists, or to determine if an act of aggression 
occurs and to make recommendations for the decongestion of the situation or to decide on its 
actions in accordance with Articles 41 and 42 to maintain or restore international peace and 
security. In terms of Article 42 the Security Council is allowed to order military intervention 
which is a clear example of the powers of the Security Council to limit the territorial integrity 
and sovereignty of States. 
In conclusion, the concept of sovereignty within the Charter of the United Nations can 
be summed up with Chainoglou’s (2007, 63) explanation that “Sovereignty is increasingly 
interpreted as a Janus double-faced concept, as a source of responsibility and immunity, of 
rights and obligations; and the challenge is to strike a balance between them.” 
 
1.5 Towards the cyber era 
With a dawn of a new era, comes always a rise on challenges that must be addressed. 
The first challenge that states have to deal with, as Chainoglou (2016) observes, is the 
borderless character of the cyber domain, which many times places the aggressors outside the 
territorial sovereignty of states. Another challenge that states have to face, intertwined with the 
concept of sovereignty, is the attribution of cyber-attacks, due to the complex nature of 
computer systems. And even if they are successful in attributing the attack, it does not 
necessarily equal to an attack within the scope of jus in bello (Chainoglou, 2013).  
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Chainoglou (2013, 202) further notes that: 
 
“While certain aspects of cyber-attacks can be reasonably dealt with within 
existing legal frameworks, it has been said more generally that the 'cyber 
domain generally falls to be regulated within the established framework of 
relevant parts of public international law'. [...] In particular, there is a sense 
of discomfort with the application of jus ad bellum and jus in bello rules to 
cyber-attacks.” 
 
Since traditional law documents failed to address the issues effectively, new legislature 
had, and still has to be produced. Besides national legislature, that many countries adopted, 
there is also the Convention on Cybercrime, adopted by the Council of Europe in 2001, the 
Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, produced by NATO’s 
Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence (CCDCOE), in 2013, as well as it’s revision 
Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare in 2017. 
The focus of this dissertation will be the Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law 
Applicable to Cyber Warfare (herein after Tallinn Manual 2.0), because it provides the most 
holistic approach towards the challenges brought about by the cyber era, and it has codified 
them in a comprehensive manner, applicable to every state. The Tallinn Manual 2.0 has its first 
chapter dedicated to sovereignty, thus showing the importance it holds, both in its traditional 
application and on cyberspace. 
The five rules regarding sovereignty in the Tallinn Manual 2.0 are: 
1.    Sovereignty, 
2.    Internal Sovereignty, 
3.    External Sovereignty, 
4.    Violation of sovereignty, and 
5.    Sovereign immunity and inviolability 
 
1.5.1 Sovereignty 
The first rule regarding sovereignty, as stated in Tallinn Manual 2.0 (pg. 11) is that 
“The principle of State sovereignty applies in cyberspace”. This rule acknowledges the fact 
that sovereignty is one of the fundamental, if not the most fundamental, principle of 
international law. This Rule also reaffirms the fact that activities on cyberspace and state-
sponsored cyber operation are examined under the principle of sovereignty. This highlights the 
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fact that States can exercise their sovereignty over any cyber related infrastructure and their 
activities within their territory. 
When it comes to state sovereignty, international law recognizes that it is a fundamental 
principle. In this Rule, the issues that are approached are broad and there is no limitation on the 
notion of sovereignty over territorial sovereignty as one focuses on cyber-space. Moreover, one 
must understand that the notion of territoriality ceases to exist in its traditional interpretation. 
On the contrary, cyber infrastructures are such that national authorities exercise jurisdiction 
abroad as well, since the persons deemed to be involved in the proceedings are involved in 
activities beyond the territory from which they carry out an activity. This point is also discussed 
on Rule 4, which is discussed below. 
Moreover, cyberspace is a "global sector" that has no specific boundaries and, while 
virtual, concerns a global joint action. Cyber activities can have an impact on the physical space 
of the state and society and may therefore fall under the jurisdiction of several national States 
(Rule 1, paragraph 5). 
Therefore, it cannot be considered that an activity taking place in the Cycladic region 
necessarily involves a given state or its territory - including airspace, water and land. Now, 
national international law and national human rights law should be reviewed and a way for 
international organizations to intervene in these areas can be found. It should be noted, 
however, that according to international law, the concept of sovereignty is - as discussed - 
internal and external, inter alia, therefore, international organizations do not enjoy sovereignty. 
In this rule the Tallinn Manual 2.0 encompasses within the principle of sovereignty the 
layers of cyberspace, namely the physical, logical and social. The physical layer includes all 
the hardware and other components. The logical layer includes the connections between 
network devices, as well as data, protocols and applications that enable connectivity between 
the components of the physical layer. Lastly, the social layer includes individuals and groups 
that operate on the cyber domain. 
Last but not least, the International Group of Experts that authored the Tallinn Manual 
2.0 agree that no State may claim sovereignty over cyberspace per se. This is due to the fact 
that a big proportion of the infrastructure necessary for the existence of cyberspace is shared 
among many States’ sovereign territories. The first rule, therefore, focuses on the concept of 
sovereignty both etymologically and practically and the application it has today. 
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1.5.2 Internal Sovereignty 
 The second rule regarding sovereignty, as stated in Tallinn Manual 2.0 (pg. 13) is that 
“The principle of State sovereignty applies in cyberspace”. Under Rule 2, States exercise 
national sovereignty in terms of government infrastructures, as well as those active in their 
territory and the electronic activities taking place in their territory, always subject to the rules 
of international law. 
In essence, Rule 2 focuses on the "internal" dimension of sovereignty, allowing States 
to define the measures and activities they deem necessary to manage a question that arises 
(Rule 2, 1). Rule 2 broadens the discussion of Rule 1 on the physical boundaries of cyberspace 
because it recognizes that there are two legal dimensions that need to be taken into account: 
the first is that cyber infrastructures and activities within it are controlled by the national 
authorities, and second, that the right of sovereignty of the state in its territory also means the 
obligation to protect the people, transactions and operations in the cyberspace, but also that 
cyberspace takes the dimension of "territoriality". Territorial cyber sovereignty exists 
irrespective of the infrastructure or the nationality of the owner of an infrastructure and so on. 
It is also noted that cyberspace is not fully vague or devoid of physical boundaries, 
since physical infrastructure is needed for its operation such as cables and there is a need for 
information transmission using a network. The purpose of Rule 2 is to lay down some legal 
and rational rules for the establishment of a common system which may contain cryptographic 
protocols or other rules for adequate control of cyberspace and activities taking place within 
the territory of a Member State and may include both natural and legal persons. Thus, it is 
possible to criminalize these persons in case of breaches of international or national law. 
The question that has been raised is at point 8 of Rule 2 is whether a state, after enjoying 
internal sovereignty, can also restrict access to cyberspace. At this point, it is stated that 
international legal standards should always be applied and fundamental freedoms recognized. 
So, the same limitations that apply in the physical world apply to cyberspace. On the basis of 
this text, it is noted that States cannot access or transmit data relating to specific areas such as 
national security issues or persons residing and operating in their territory, unless international 
law provides for a different rule. 
 
1.5.3 External Sovereignty 
  The third rule regarding sovereignty, as stated in Tallinn Manual 2.0 (pg. 16) is 
that “A State is free to conduct cyber activities in its international relations, subject to any 
contrary rule of international law binding on it”. The content of this article is just as complex 
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as that of Rules 1 and 2 and is a logical continuation of the above. Based on this Rule, anyone, 
including the States, is free to engage in cyber activities, without prejudice to the rules laid 
down by international law. 
External sovereignty, as a concept, in this Rule arises from national sovereignty as 
defined in Article 2 of the UN Charter. Therefore, no state has an advantage over the other and 
there is equality between them in all fields. In this sense, the definition of external sovereignty 
aims to include the concept of external security and the freedom of the state to engage in cyber 
activities and is reformulated as long as there is no violation of any principle of international 
law. 
Recognizing the equality of States in cyberspace is an important dimension that can 
allow protection of the sovereignty of States in general. It also gives freedom to States to choose 
whether they want to set up special cyber regimes in application of Rule 1. 
 
1.5.4 Violation of Sovereignty 
 The fourth rule regarding sovereignty, as stated in Tallinn Manual 2.0 (pg. 17) is that 
“The principle of State sovereignty applies in cyberspace”. Rule 4 focuses on the consequences 
of violating the sovereignty of other States from a Member State into cyberspace. On the basis 
of this, it is completely prohibited to carry out operations which may jeopardize or challenge 
the sovereignty of another State, as is also the case in international law. 
Rule 4 incorporates the content of Rules 2 and 3 and analyzes the consequences of non-
compliance with these Rules. Particular emphasis is placed on cases where there is an exception 
to the rule of not interfering in the activities of a Member State, but also to the failure to 
disregard state sovereignty. In this respect, in particular, it is recognized that the competence 
of UN bodies, such as the Security Council, to approve such violations on the basis of Article 
76 of the UN Charter and the right of the State to self-defense on the basis of Article 71. 
Similarly, it is noted that this rule applies to international / transnational relations, 
provided that the Member States recognize the primacy of international law, the equality of 
national sovereignty of States around the world, and their duty to protect international peace 
and security. Thus, the state must take measures to curb terrorism and behaviors that can be 
dangerous to other States, and are thus required to warn other Member States of malicious 
actions. However, this does not translate into a right to violate the internal sovereignty of other 
Member States (Rule 4 (2)). Close attention is also needed for the action of non-state actors 
such as organized armed groups. 
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If there is a threat to the state and the right to self-defense is exercised or there is an 
objection to the necessity, then, under Rule 4, paragraph 4, countermeasures and penalties are 
provided for non-compliance. Since, under Rule 2, the State's sovereignty principle also 
includes cyberspace, the State is responsible for compensating a third State which has suffered 
critical infrastructure damage even if there is no damage to other infrastructures (Rule 4 5). 
More generally, international law on soil, the sea and airspace applies to cyberspace and, 
conversely, whether there is any impact on the state from activities carried out in the airborne, 
marine and marine environment. space, then there is corresponding responsibility from that 
state. The same applies to espionage and violation of other rights and obligations under the 
rules of international law and customary law. 
However, as there is still no full agreement as to what cyberspace, cyber-functions and 
so on, and there is uncertainty about the evolution of cyberspace, based on paragraph 10 of 
Rule 5, the evaluation is based on two criteria: (a) the extent of the offense and (b) the direct 
intervention of the governmental functions. While paragraph 11 of Rule 5 States that the 
analysis concerns (a) whether there was physical harm, (b) if there was a loss of functionality, 
and (c) if the violation of national sovereignty leads to a marginal loss of functionality. In both 
cases the object and purpose of the principle of national sovereignty and the type of offense, as 
well as whether there was unlawful use of force, physical damage, the impact of damage and 
the degree of loss of infrastructure functionality, are examined. 
Consensus was seen as a difficult task, and for that reason specific criteria were set for 
the definition of the offense, the consequences for the domestic legal sphere and the 
international community as well as the individuals, physically and legally, within the state. It 
is important that there is no violation of the personal data of natural and legal persons, 
usurpation of national sovereignty and the rights of the state in general. 
An example of the complexity of the questions raised concerns those undertakings 
which impede part or all of the businesses of another State on the Internet or access the Internet. 
In these cases, the International Expert Group has considered that there is only a violation of 
the sovereignty of the third state as far as access to infrastructure is considered, although there 
is a risk of violation of other international law rules at the same time. Thus, the extent of the 
violations, the type and the consequences differ, and the purpose of the state, the measures and 
the actions required to deal with them must be considered. It is noted, therefore, that the nature 
of cybercrime violations is unpredictable and there can be broad social, economic and strategic 
consequences of activities, businesses and malicious internet activities. 
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Trust between Member States, respect for international law and rules in force in 
peacetime and cross-sectoral / international cooperation is required. This is an important 
addition to the Tallinn Manual 2.0 due to its international relations focus, since all of the 
aforementioned prerequisites apply to international law. 
 
1.5.5 Sovereign immunity and inviolability 
 The fifth rule regarding sovereignty, as stated in Tallinn Manual 2.0 (pg. 27) is that 
“Any interference by a State with cyber infrastructure aboard a platform, wherever located, that 
enjoys sovereign immunity constitutes a violation of sovereignty”. 
This rule stresses that, regardless of the setting in which an intervention takes place, the 
infrastructure or the view from a third country recognized violation of the sovereignty of the 
Member State in which one violation occurred. In particular, because Rule 5 focuses on objects 
and functions that enjoy state immunity, it is noted that the examination of the incidents should 
be extremely cautious. The Paragraph 2 of Rule 5 stipulates the inviolability of state immunity, 
a right which extends to cyberspace, even given that the infrastructure does not serve national 
purposes exclusively. After all, national sovereignty and immunity are inviolable and 
interference is not allowed. 
An example given concerns the non-consensual entry naval / military aircraft in the 
national airspace, in the case of cyberspace, if the aircraft can happen performs activities 
making use of this infrastructure. In this case, measures can be envisaged to put an end to these 
activities and countermeasures. Also, based on para. 6, the governmental infrastructure of 
neutral States may be classified, under certain conditions, as a military target, thus requiring 
the establishment of a special cyber-operational infrastructure protection system, electronic 
files and so on in order to avoid a full crisis. 
Lastly, it must be mentioned that in the event of an international armed conflict, the 
principles of sovereignty and inviolability cease to apply, regarding the relations of the 
conflicting parties (subject to any specific rule of international law to the contrary, such as 
Article 45 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations). This practically means, assets, 
otherwise enjoying sovereign immunity and inviolability, may be destroyed upon qualification 
as military objectives or may be seized as booty of war and ownership immediately passes to 
the captor forces by virtue of capture. Exceptions may apply for assets that are granted special 
protection by the application of bilateral or multilateral agreements (e.g. status of forces 
agreements), as well as certain infrastructure and electronic assets that are protected under 
diplomatic and consular law. 
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2. National Interest 
2.1 Introduction 
Tang Lan (2016) vibrantly asserts that in cases such as terrorists organizing online 
“national interests must be defended, and national sovereignty is necessary to do that. 
Therefore, any state must be able to decide what measures to take when it comes to defending 
their national interests in cyberspace.” He continues on by underlying how the exigencies of 
cyberspace prove to be quite problematic when it comes to jurisdiction application and on the 
application of “state power to protect national sovereignty”. While oceans of ink have been 
spilled on what constitutes national sovereignty when it comes to cyberspace, national interest 
notably is only mentioned in passing in the foreword by Toomas Hendrik Ilves (2017) in which 
he laments how the initiatives undertaken to forage to the international law applying when it 
comes to cyberspace has been “sometimes hobbled by narrow national interest and 
perspectives” or in the Tallinn Manual itself when it sporadically and sparingly refers to 
“critical national interests” without defining what qualifies as such. 
This lack of definition(s) when it comes to national interests does not limit itself to 
cyberspace alone. In practice all governments have their own unique definitions and 
elaboration on what constitutes their national interests and this explanation may offer a correct 
or a wrong definition of national interests (Burchill, 2005). For instance, most political leaders 
in the United States define their national interests using broad terms to a degree that almost all 
events around the world are of interest to the United States (Barnett, 2008). In relation to this 
is a widely held notion that the United States needs to offer leadership in virtually every conflict 
and crisis happening in international politics. Such incidences provide politicians with 
numerous opportunities for engaging to the point of abuse the concept of national interests 
(Kowert, 2001). 
The special category and notion of national interests has in the recent past enjoyed 
revitalization in certain areas of dialogue on international relations (Nielson & Tierney, 2003). 
It is the central role that the state possesses and in remaining the authority and foundation where 
modern international relations and international law is based that this revitalization is based.  
The main reason for the revitalization of the concept of national interest is a state, in specifics 
it’s an effect of the growing geopolitical thinking in the United States (Lake, 2007; Beitz, 
1979). Moreover, the rebirth of this concept is in many ways rooted to the need to redefine the 
role of America in international affairs with the intention of generating a justification for 
minimizing that role after the end of the Cold War (Hyde-Price, 2006; Ikenberry, 2012). 
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Going back to the beginning it is easily perceivable that national interest as a concept 
predates the concept of national security and is currently assuming its proper position in the 
United States political discourse (Lake, 2007; Burchill, 2005). To realise this change, it is vital 
for these changes to be put in context in relation to the Neorealist theory of international 
relations. This thesis investigates various issues around the international relations theories that 
are tied to the concept of national interests, especially the one of Neorealism, as applied in the 
current world. 
The concept of national interest is very important in the Neorealism paradigm of 
international relations theory as it determines a nation’s foreign policy and ultimately its ability 
to secure its sustainability from an international perspective. From the analysis of the concept 
of national interest as positioned by various Neorealists and also illustrated in real international 
relations issues, it is evident that national interests are not self-evident and are generally not 
national in nature, in the sense of the state and domestic preoccupation, but they originate from 
the numerous interactions between the main actors of the international system, in our case the 
States. 
Various interest groups in the international system greatly influence national interests 
and therefore, Neorealists believe that effective focus on national interests should be externally 
driven and not internally developed and implemented externally. Neorealist also believe that 
identification of the national interests is not as important as identifying the various actors and 
elements and their levels of influence on the national interests of a country. 
Generally, from a Neorealism theory perspective, national interests are granted to a 
nation the emphasis on the effects of international system on a country’s security. 
Consequently, security is the most significant national interest of any country and the ultimate 
determinant of an effective foreign policy of any nation. 
Many Neorealists would argue that effective focus on national interests should be 
limited to focusing on international issues that are within the capability of a nation. In the 
concluding remarks of this thesis we would like to employ an expressive example of the above 
assertion, that is the enjoyment by the United States of a unipolar system of affairs in 
international relations in its most recent history. Reviewing its recent activities illustrates a 
contrasting perspective to the beliefs of Neorealists, as the country has done in the recent past, 
focusing on increasing its global influence in a speed that is too fast and threaten to overstretch 
the American resources and hence collapse of status lead actually to today’s multi-polar world. 
Theorists in international relations focus on policy relevance as a benchmark of value 
supplementary to scientific truth. However, very little is said by Neorealists about national 
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interests as much as it is classified as a key aspect of the theory of international relations (Hyde-
Price, 2006; Burley, 1993; Goldstein, 2007).  In particular, the silence by Neorealists is clearly 
notable as Waltz (1974), the founder of the Neorealist theory of international relations argues 
that the idea of a nation pursuing its national interests or seeking its own preservation is only 
stimulating if the specific national interests that a country should focus on are identified. The 
above explains the silence about the concept of national interests by current Neorealists since 
it’s mainly due to its low levels of interest as compared to other (more easily explorable) 
concepts. 
As Waltz (1974) suggests, Neorealists find the concept of national interests 
monotonous since they have failed to determine the specific national interests that need to be 
explored by a state. Even though self-preservation can be considered as a perfect response to 
Waltz question, in-depth analysis of Waltz theory highlights the emphasis on what a country 
needs to do from the perspective of national interests (Goldsmith & Posner, 2005). 
Furthermore, it is the realist, Morgenthau, who further postulates that self-preservation is a 
necessary but insufficient rejoinder to this issue (Sagan, 2012; Burchill, 2005). 
Morgenthau wanting to contribute and provide an explanation of the definition of power 
in terms of national interests, highlights the imperativeness of space and time without which 
the idea of international relations is non-existent (Rittberger, 2004). Morgenthau argues that 
the particular types of interests that influence a political action in a specific historical period is 
dependent on the cultural and political context within which the formulation of foreign policy 
takes place (Jackson et al., 2012; Krahmann, 2005). Consequently, the increasing silence of the 
Neorealists with regard to the concept of national interests might illustrate a point of theoretical 
malaise. 
The concept of malaise explains the methodological pluralisms that emanated from the 
critics of Neorealism in the 1980s. Even though many theories of international relations often 
use the same words, they do not generally communicate because they do not speak the same 
methodological language-in other words, they have no common methodological basis to 
discuss their differences-to the point they became unintelligible to each other. (Lake, 2007) 
Due to this intellectual anarchy, a serious after-effect is how research programs that 
lack enough funding are being crowded out. Unmarketable approaches and methods are 
therefore shutdown or downsized or acquired by distant paradigms. The last issue especially 
concerns currently numerous theoretical practitioners that elaborate on the intellectual mergers 
that take place due to epistemological issues that emanate from their integration (Taylor, 1992; 
Bieler, 2001). 
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A direct result of the above approach results in the creation of an almost market place 
on ideas related to the theory of international relations that is threatened by the propensity to 
evolve from monopolistic competition into oligopoly where research studies left after 
consolidation are the major consumers of new intellectual commodities (Sagan, 2012). They 
therefore control the market place and can influence the specific technical characteristics. The 
worst outcome of this situation is that the capacity of translation and dialogue among multiple 
traditions in the discipline is currently being lost (Collard-Wexler, 2006). 
With relation to practicing theorists, the source of this behavior is even deeper as 
compared to the diverse conceptions regarding the research methodology. This is mainly as a 
result of the effects of real world observance and undertaking of analysis. Some approaches 
that emerged as a result of the Cold War remain valid but their universality has declined. But 
how all the above apply to our search for understanding when it comes to the analysis of the 
concept of national interest? 
For instance, the idea of neoliberal institutionalism if founded on a study of the 
economic interactions between industrialized States (Jackson et al., 2012) in retrospect makes 
it incompatible with emerging and developing economies. For instance, the position of Russia 
as the leader among equals in the former Soviet Union complicates the applicability of models 
that existed during the reign of the Soviet Union (Taliaferro, 2006). The splitting up of the 
Soviet Union into different States as well as the existing ethnic divisions in the new States 
complicated furthermore the theoretical issues (Caporaso, 1992).  It is in this way that the new 
independent States of the former Soviet Union are a clear case point. The need to delineate the 
concept of national interest in the former soviet cannot be equated to the United States case 
where the overt dialogue on national interest is much deeper than the general idea of national 
preservation (Sagan, 2012; Wohlforth, 2008). 
Numerous States, including the United States, are seeking ways of defining their 
national interest as a basis of foreign policy formulation. Such an approach naturally makes the 
issue have more than just transitory relevance, especially since the case in hand is having the 
majority of the States around the world not being governed by well institutionalized 
bureaucratic structures while they do in fact have monopolized the exercise of physical force 
over an adjoining territory as is the case of most of advanced economies in the world (Collard-
Wexler, 2006; Taylor, 1992; Al-Rodhan, 2007). 
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2.2 Waltz's Theory of International Relations and his take on national interests 
Structural realists endeavor to expound on the nature of international relations through 
splitting the state level, whereas Waltz defines national States within international relations as 
units at system level within the structure. 
Waltz believes not only that it is possible to establish results formulated for the 
subsystem by considering them at the system level (Waltz, 1974), but also that all States are, 
in the end of the day, security seekers and anarchy exists at the global level (Shain & Barth, 
2003). Therefore, the concept of neorealism as positioned by Waltz highlights the concepts of 
anarchy, structure, capability, power distribution, polarity and ultimately national interests 
(Waltz, 1974; Taliaferro, 2006; Blyth, 2003). 
The first two concepts, being structure and anarchy, -as it is going to be illustrated 
below-, are entangled.  Another axiom is that the structure of the international system is 
considered to be anarchic.  A small clarification at this point would be that the concept of 
anarchy as used in this context does not refer to the presence of disorder and chaos. It only 
refers to the lack of a global government (Waltz 1979; Risse‐Kappen, 1996). 
 Recapping the previous axioms all together is it concluded that without a central global 
authority that offers stability and security in international issues, global politics is not 
hierarchically and formally organized. Consequently, international politics is structured by 
anarchy which is the opposite of what happens in domestic politics, that are themselves 
hierarchically structured (Taliaferro, 2006; Williams, 2004). The International system is 
therefore defined on the basis of an anarchical international structure (Banks, 1984). According 
to the literature on the issue, operating in an anarchical structure has two major implications. 
Firstly, every player in international systems is only looking after itself which makes 
an international system a self-help system. The international system is therefore made up of 
self-regarding elements whose major emphasis is survival (Hobson, 2001). Secondly, taking 
into consideration that national States are the only actors of international relations that have a 
centralized and established legitimate authority to employ force when protecting their interests 
(Jackson et al., 2012; Barkdull & Harris, 2002), makes them (sovereign States) therefore the 
main elements that make up the international system and main actors in global politics. 
Accordingly, the organizing standard utilized in international structure is anarchy and 
this structure is defined with reference to individual States. Moreover, national States 
continually feel threatened by the potential of attack by other States (Checkel, 1998). As Waltz 
(1979) illustrates, due to the lack of global commanding authority, no single country is obliged 
per se to obey another in international relations. Since each nation persistently feels insecure, 
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each country must be in a position to fend for itself. This culminates to the aspect capability as 
another concept influencing international relations. It is Capabilities that have been found to 
be instrumental for countries in order to guarantee their survival. 
 An assessment, and in a way attempted definition, of capability from a neorealist 
perspective is influenced by five major criteria, including its demographic, economic, 
technological, and military capacity as well as its natural resource capacity (Sagan, 2012; 
Taliaferro, 2006; Collard-Wexler, 2006). But it is not only the absolute capacities of a state that 
makes up its capability assessment. The focus on survival motivates States to focus especially 
on the aspect of relative gains. Relative gains signify the relative amelioration of a state’s 
capability in relation to another and how much more important is, for ensuring one’s state 
survival, to always ensure that their relative gain is well above another’s-even in the occasion 
that absolute gains are decreased. Moving forward, it’s presumably without difficulty to 
understand that each state has a different level of capability, making nations States easily 
distinguished based on their capability level in the international system. For the above reasons, 
Neorealists attempt to paint a national picture of each nation’s capabilities at any given time. 
This notion is generally referred to as the relative capability of a state (Slaughter et al., 1998). 
Connecting all the above concepts leads to the understanding that, since States are 
constantly insecure, they unendingly wish to acquire higher capabilities. This dynamic 
originates what constitutes one of the most magnificent enigma of international politics, the so 
called ‘security dilemma’. The security dilemma is the outcome of the combination of the 
States tendencies that have been previously described. Specifically, 1) in an endeavor to attain 
sufficient security from a potential attack, nations are forced to acquire more capabilities as a 
way of evading the effects of capabilities of other nations (Baylis, 2001). 2) This makes other 
nations more insecure compelling them to prepare for any eventuality (Good, 1960; Burchill, 
2005). 3) Since no single nation can feel entirely secure in the global environment that is filled 
with competing units, this competition guarantees a vicious circle of capability and security 
accumulation (Krahmann, 2005). 4) As countries compete for security, they realize varying 
levels of capabilities resulting to unequal distribution of capabilities across the units of global 
system. 5) Based on this perspective, the ranking of nations depends on the components of 
relative capability. 6) Consecutively, a moment arrives in which augmenting one’s (state’s) 
capabilities might well decrease its own security because of the increased fear (and immediate 
reactions) that the augmented capabilities will cause to the other States in the international 
system.  The above analysis of the way these capabilities are distributed is generally formed in 
the Neorealism paradigm of international relations. 
25 
 
Another notion that is significant in our analysis is the notion of polarity that is also key 
to positioning national interests as illustrated in Neorealism theory. The polarity of the 
international system is influenced by how capabilities are distributed across units in a given 
time (Behr, 2010; Cowles, 2003). This approach further facilitates the separate typification of 
the given environment in the international system. Based on existing information about 
polarity, it is possible to distinguish between three forms of polarity, namely, unipolarity, 
bipolarity, and multipolarity (De Mesquita, 2006). Unipolarity exists when a single country in 
the system is superior in relation to other nations in terms of economic, demographic, 
technological, and military capabilities. The current state of international system tended/tends 
to be unipolar as the United States maintained and in many ways still maintains technological, 
economic, and military supremacy in the world. There are however opposing views that believe 
that our system is currently multi-polar. Bipolarity exists in situations where capabilities are 
distributed among two nations as illustrated during the cold war era where the United States 
and the Soviet Union represented the two poles of global power (Humphreys, 2007; Newman, 
2010). Multipolarity on the other hand happens when more than just two nations possess 
equivalent relative capability. This was evident in the global system in the periods that followed 
the First and Second World Wars. 
Having explained and elaborated on all the above concepts will hopefully help in 
illustrating the concept of national interest, which is admittedly elusive in nature. Some 
attempts to define what constitutes national interests arises from the previous descriptions of 
the current situation in the international system. For example, as countries strive for security, 
they seek to expand their capabilities to align with those of their rivals. Thus, it can be said that 
promoting economic, military and territorial security are key ingredients of what constitutes 
the national interests of a state (De Mesquita, 2006). At the same time, as we very explicitly 
illustrated above, the capability of a state as compared to others equips or constraints States to 
pursue such interests. Hence, it can be also concluded that the ambition and scope of a nation’s 
interests are actually controlled by its capability levels (Krahmann, 2005). 
Using the aforementioned attempted definition, within a neorealist conceptual 
framework, States national interests can be attempted to be understood when analyzed with 
reference to their capability ranking. In general, however, it has to be admitted that Waltz’s 
consideration of national interests is rooted on the idea that national interests are taken as a 
given (Burchill, 2005; Houghton, 2007). 
 Consequently, when aspiring to attempt a comprehensive analysis of national interests within 
the Neorealist paradigm, questions that logically follows pertain to such things as the source of 
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national interests and the process through which these interests are formulated as well as the 
consideration of the motives of the actors behind actions they describe to be their actual 
national interests (Cox, 1981). 
 
2.3 National Interests: A Historical Perspective 
The concept of national interest has diverse interpretations among the theories of 
international politics. However, research studies published by Beard Charles in the early 20 th 
century provides a clear picture of the roots of the concept of national interests as represented 
in various historical theoretical perspectives. According to Beard’s publications, the concept 
of national interests as practiced in the United States is heavily influenced by the economic 
interests of various societies and groups in the nation (Németh, 2009; Goldsmith & Posner, 
2005). These societies and groups focus on ensuring their specific interests forms part of the 
national interests of the country. He concluded that national interests are derived from 
particular group interests. 
This conceptualization of national interests naturally goes against of core assumptions 
of the Neorealist paradigm of International Relations such as the identification of certain 
interests that transcend classes and specificities and thus form a unified, state-wide, 
conceptualization of the national interest. But in order to continue in the same vein as a historic 
analysis dictates and to clearly position the concept of national interests as illustrated by various 
studies that Beard conducted about the international politics of United States, we see that in 
those he demonstrated and affirmed that two major interest groups influenced the 
understanding of the concept of national interests in the United States (Németh, 2009; Adigbuo, 
2007). 
The first group assigned importance of the local development and market in the 
country’s international relations. According to Beard, this group claimed that the United States 
needs to prosper locally to and should not be concerned about the rest of the world (Good, 
1960). The other interest group were interested with international trade and manufacturers 
activities. This group argued that United States needed to care for international issues if they 
affected its safety and prosperity. 
Following this particular conceptualization of national interests, it is needed to address 
the issue in a wider understanding and employment. In particular, if interests and ideas are 
reviewed as inseparable and interests are understood as entailing human interpretations and 
perceptions as research has also established (Pham, 2008), then this implies that interests have 
been found to not only be very subjective but also limited to specific social settings. 
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As Beard illustrated, interests are expressed through ideas which in most cases have 
material things in mind and are also linked to social relationships (Ikenberry, 2012). 
Consequently, by a historical point of view in might well be impossible to develop national 
interest from an objective point of view. 
Furthermore, the contrast between interests and ideas that are nevertheless intertwined 
cannot be easily clarified, especially since both are necessary for any realistic view of global 
issues. Therefore, when interests are mentioned, the ideas attributed with the interests and their 
premises must be provided as well (Németh, 2009; Ray, 2003). 
As much as these thoughts were developed over 50 years, before being revisited by 
constructivist and liberals in the 1990s, they have been vital in positioning the concept of 
national interests in international relation theories (Risse‐Kappen, 1996). No matter the fact 
that the approach adopted by Beard in exploring the concept of national interests was historical 
and lacked a theoretical positioning (Checkel, 1998) it is of interest for this thesis to explore 
the concept of national interests even in that way so as to better demonstrate the contrast with 
specific reference to Neorealists’ perspective.  
 
2.4 National Interests: A Realist Perspective  
2.4.1 Morgenthau and national interests 
  Morgenthau was focused on theorizing the sphere of international politics when he 
formulated the concept of national interests as the pole position of classical realism. This 
culminated to the emergence of the debate about the concept of national interests in the mid-
20th century (Keohane, 1989). Morgenthau offered a summary of the fundamental principles 
of realism seeking a way of positioning and explaining away global politics. 
According to Morgenthau, national interests are an instrument for researchers as well 
as a decision makers’ guide on issues pertaining global relations (Hopf, 1998; Smith, 2000). 
This position was based on an assumption that objective laws influence international politics 
processes and are not dynamic. The aforementioned position is key to realist’s approach to the 
study of the world. As Morgenthau supposed and tried to illustrate, objective laws emanate 
from human nature and the most significant law is that thoughts and actions of Statesmen are 
based on the interests that are defined as power (Ikenberry, 2012; Morgenthau, 1951). 
This idea has been significant to realists while developing an understanding of 
international politics as well as during the formulation of theoretical postulations about 
international relations. Morgenthau affirms that interests as defined by power has been 
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significantly determinant of historical political decisions and actions making it not only an 
objective category but also universally valid. Thus, Morgenthau believes that interests as an 
idea is an essence of politics (Hollifield, 2000). However, the proposed resilient relationship 
between nation-state and interests cannot be assumed to last forever if one takes into 
consideration the context of historical occurrence it takes place in. It is therefore highly 
subjectable to change in the future when the significance of nation-States cannot be assumed 
to just continue to be same (Németh, 2009; Finnemore, 1996). 
Consequently, what Morgenthau ultimately does is to raise the level of consideration 
of the fact that interests are inseparable from cultural and political context in which decisions 
on foreign policy are founded. Even though Morgenthau appreciates the imperativeness of 
cultural context, he as well just assumes that each nation clearly knows its interests. Therefore, 
according to Morgenthau every nation pursues its own interest through accumulation of power 
used in realization of said interests. 
Based on this position, Morgenthau considers national interest to be non-problematic 
as a concept and does not provide information about the sources of these interests (Shell, 1995; 
Payne, 2007). However, several critics on Morgenthau postulations have emerged pointing out 
that developing an understanding of national interests based on this perspective does not 
provide an individual with information about the behavior of nations in international politics 
(Pham, 2008). 
 
2.4.2 Waltz and national interests 
  As highlighted above, Waltz is among the founders of the paradigm of Neorealism. His 
research was based and developed on exploring the weaknesses of classical realists including 
Morgenthau. His criticism was founded on his very different take and very different key 
assumptions as compared to those postulated by Morgenthau (Waltz, 1996; Finnemore, 1996). 
Waltz argues that the classical realists were focused on interests, power, judgement of 
Statesman and human nature without exploring an international politics system inherently 
(Good, 1960; Pugh, 2004). 
He States that Neorealists have been successful in addressing the limitations of classical 
realism by separating international and internal demesnes of politics. This made it possible for 
Waltz to formulate an international relations theory that explained away many occurrences that 
realism just assumed as self-explanatory. As Waltz affirms, Neorealism advances the idea of 
system structures which at an instant constraint the domains that learners of international 
politics struggle with by enabling them to visualize how a system structure and its internal 
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variations influence the interacting units and the results generated (Keohane, 1989; Copeland, 
2000). 
Waltz believes that an international system is decentralized and anarchic as illustrated 
above. This state of international system is based on the fact that international politics work in 
settings where the government and other agents that have system-wide authority are non-
existent. In such a system the principle of self-help prevails making system units, which in this 
occasion are the States, to focus on promoting their individual survival (Taylor, 1992). Waltz 
postulates that survival is a precondition in the process of realization of all other objects of a 
nation making every nation to divert its efforts in defending its survival. 
Accordingly, Neorealists’ perspective of the concept of national interests is rooted in 
the survival of the state (Baylis et al., 2013). According to Waltz, the idea of a country acting 
in accordance to its national interests implies attempting to meet its security requirements after 
an analysis and assessment of the current situation. Based on this position, Waltz affirms that 
nations often formulate policies based on their current situation and implement their policies 
carefully to ensure their existence is not threatened (Waltz, 1996; Finnemore, 1996). Based on 
this perspective, Neorealists consider national interests to be actual products of the international 
system structure. Based on these reasoning, national interests for nation States are provided by 
the developments taking place at any given moment internationally wide and therefore it’s not 
possible to enumerate basic principles from which they derive from, as postulated by 
Neorealists at least. Thus, from a neorealistic perspective, analysis of the approaches through 
which the national interests are achieved is the most interesting phenomenon (Guzman, 2002). 
As much as this understanding of national interests is persuasive, it has been criticized 
to be very narrow in the sense that by being based on the survival of the state perspective, it is 
impractical to explain numerous issues that current international actors content with (Good, 
1960). For example, this perspective does not provide explanations about disintegration of 
States and the role of international organizations and multinational companies in international 
politics. Consequently, this consideration of national interests as postulated by Neorealists is 
assumed by many not to be well developed to address the sophisticated nature of international 
relations and how they affect national interests (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). Thus, as a final attempt 
to comprehensively analyze the specific aspects of national interests as postulated by the 
Neorealist paradigm, it is important to examine the concept of power as well, as an aspect of 
national interests.  
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2.4.3 Mearsheimer and national interests 
Mearsheimer perspective on the concept of national interests is an illustration of recent 
advancements of Neorealist perspectives on national interests (2001). His undertaking 
positions national interests with the emphasis on the focus on promoting the persistence of the 
state. Specifically, in his essay entitled “America Unhinged”, which is well grounded in the 
Neorealist perspective, he emphasises on the imperativeness of focusing national interests on 
promoting security and sustainability though avoiding unnecessary international relations 
activities (Williams, 2005; Shain & Barth, 2003). 
Specifically, Mearsheimer is frustrated by what he perceives as liberal imperialists and 
non-conservative hawks that dominate the United States foreign policy despite their various 
failures related to the decisions to go to war in the Middle East (2011). Mearsheimer proceeds 
to affirm that the United States unfounded claims of strategic aspects of countries is exposing 
the country to violence in the international relations; hence limiting its focus on its actual 
national interests which is protection of the country’s security and economic interests in the 
global environment. Mearsheimer wrote this article when the United States was still deeply 
involved in internal affairs of Egypt and Syria with claims of these nations being vital to the 
United States national interests. 
As Mearsheimer affirms, there is nothing essential in Egypt and Syria that United States 
cannot survive without. Clearly, Mearsheimer approach to Neorealism is rooted to restoring 
the paradigm of Neorealism in the development of strategic decisions involving international 
relations as it allows the events in the international environment to present national interests to 
the country and not the country to enforce its national interests in an environment that they are 
incompatible and unacceptable. 
In general, Mearsheimer believes that the focus on liberalism in development of foreign 
policy in the United States has resulted to it implementing strategies that do not reflect their 
actual national interests in global affairs and ultimately tainting the image of the nation in 
international relations (Waltz, 2000; Rathbun, 2008). Consequently, Mearsheimer believes that 
as much as the United States has a history of successfully dealing with worst tyrants, it has 
never been threatened by anti-American populists as the current society imagines it to be. 
According to him, a Neorealism’s view of international relations is mainly dependent 
on geography which is vast in the United States and therefore threats that emanate from 
insignificant Middle Eastern political instability issues do not warrant to form part of the 
appropriation of national interests. Consequently, the meddling and overambitious foreign 
policy of the United States is more harmful to the country’s political values and ultimate 
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national interests (O'Neill et al., 2004). Specifically, a nation that cultivates its national interest 
with the focus on lying to its citizens, the contempt of the rule of law, increasing secrecy and 
the massive invasion of privacy clearly illustrate reversed national interests that can be 
corrected if the Neorealists approach is considered in the country (Mearsheimer, 2013). 
Based on the position taken by Mearsheimer, power is the most important factor in 
identifying national interests with relation to foreign policy. The ability of the United States to 
successfully manage the effects of the Cold War illustrated the success that can be attained if 
a nation’s foreign policy can be centered on building its power (Sagan, 2012; Jørgensen, 2004). 
Recent efforts by the United States that have emphasized on demonstrating power rather than 
developing power have not been in the national interest of the nation as Mearsheimer 
postulates. Consequently, Neorealists have developed a strong link between power and national 
interests. 
 
2.5 Comments and remarks 
  Throughout this chapter, the significance of each state’s national interests has been 
highlighted. The main issue encountered is the lack of literature giving in-depth analysis of 
national interests. Even the lack of a commonly accepted definition adds to the complexity. On 
top of that, the cyber domain, with its special characteristics further adds to the complexity. 
 However, even though there is no commonly accepted way to define national interests, 
it does not mean that states do not project and protect them. It is anticipated that states protect 
vital national interests on cyberspace. In the authors firm belief that the neorealists approach 
towards national interest, will become the foundation upon the analytical norms for the 
correlation of national interest and cyberspace will be built. 
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3. National Paradigms 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims at including examples from countries apart from those who are full 
member States of either the EU or NATO. The selection has been made on the basis of 
necessity, relativity and significance of an elaborate analysis for each example and has been 
based on the overall literature review completed by the researcher throughout the course of his 
studies in the MA program for which this thesis has been drafted. The main criteria taken into 
account are (Solana, 2003):  
1)  The characteristics of each nation state, including its geography, overall status 
as powers in their region, strategic importance and exposure to threat. 
2)   The legal, administrative and executive patterns and systems applied by the 
States that have been considered. 
3)   The level of risk for these countries and them being or not targets of 
transnational criminal and terrorist organizations which will mean that they will 
have to be forced to tackle an immediate and large-scale attack to their cyber-
spaces. 
4)  Other relevant issues that are being faced by the societies of those member 
States that can impact the fight against terrorism, such as fundamentalism, social 
unrest, lack of democratization etc. (Yesilyurt, 2010)
 
 Considering all the aforementioned areas, the dissertation shall focus on a critical 
analysis and review of four specific case studies, that will be used as typical examples of 
countries that fulfil all the above criteria and can add to the value of the paper. The core scope 
of this analytical critique is to identify the key priorities of countries that need to act 
individually and are neither neoliberal or forced to follow a “joint” approach with other 
countries, at least to the extent that EU-NATO members do and discuss the measures their 
governments have taken in order to protect their sovereignty and cyber-spaces, either 
proactively or in the wake of an attack (Conway, 2017).
 
Those countries are: Belarus, Saudi 
Arabia, and Israel.  
 
3.2 Belarus 
In order for one to be able to elaborate on the Belarusian example as a case study, it 
would be crucial to begin by including some key introductory information on the country. 
According to the CIA World Factbook (Central Intelligence Agency), then, for 2018: 
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-  Even though Belarus attained its sovereignty from the Soviet Union as early as in 
1991, the process of stabilizing the institutions and ensuring the democratic function 
of its national institutions is still ongoing. Therefore, the country is considered the 
only non-liberal nation state in the European continent and has been the center of 
attention by international relations analysts and political leaders, international 
organizations, academics etc. for the past three decades. 
-    The government of the country tends, then, to use authoritative strategies to tackle 
its security issues and the people enjoy rights to a limited extent, only. 
-    Belarus is a land-locked country, located at a region of major strategic interest for 
the international society, sharing borders with both the EU and Russia, as well as 
major energy paths. 
-  Although, before 1990, the country has been rather well-developed when being part 
of the USSR, nowadays, it is less economically and technologically advanced than 
its neighbors in the Baltic region. The economy is highly nationalized and the 
government uses almost dictatoric mechanisms to control it. 
-   At the same time, the country is dependent to Russia for its energy imports and 
maintains, as a key national goal, to maintain its national sovereignty. 
Cyber threat and cyber terrorism for Belarus are constant threats, as what happens in 
any other modern country. The fact that there is an extremely strict framework applied to ensure 
that all information published and shared by the mass media in the country, and that the 
communications in Belarus are monopolized by the public company “Beltelecom”, it is clear 
that internet remains rather open and is more difficult to be monitored by the government 
(Ponomarev, 2010).
 
In particular, the Ministry of Communications (MIC), in collaboration with other stated 
owned companies and national institutions such as the State Center for Information Security 
(GCBI), Top Level Domain (TLD) and the Belarusian Domain Name Service (DNS) aim at 
fully monitoring all types of exchange of data and information and protect the national 
sovereignty, the interests of the States as well as the power of the authoritative government. 
Particular emphasis is being given at a national level at (Geers, 2011):
 
-  Monitoring the elections and minimizing opposition through “muzzling” all 
alternative opinions. Particularly, on March 19th, 2006, the media have gone as far 
as to declare that Mr. A. Milinkevich, the opposition candidate, has died before the 
elections. During the same period, various websites have been made inaccessible to 
the public. 
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-   The government systematically uses internet filters to maintain order and regulate 
the state. 
 However, the EU, as an organization that has been created with an aim to share liberal 
values in the continent, has not ignored Belarus from its agenda to tackle and repress cyber-
threat and cyber-terrorism. On the contrary, the EU institutions and the leaders of its member 
States have been particularly clear about their position and have pointed out the need to 
democratize the Belarusian system. Also, it has been pointed out that, violating the right to 
freedom of expression and opinion in the country not only violates international law but, also, 
makes the country more likely to experience a wide national crisis due to the rise of radical 
political groups, fundamentalism or crime, as a response to governmental abuse of power and 
systematic suppression of the right of the citizens. Particular emphasis has been given on media 
liberalization and proliferation of internet usage as first steps towards an improvement of the 
situation in the country. However, Mr. A. Lukashenko, the “unofficial dictator” of Belarus 
since 1996 does not appear willing to comply with those strategies and recommendations 
(Bosse, 2009).
 
Geers (2011) has identified a number of key examples to discuss the development of 
cyber security and the role of the internet in the country, among which: 
  
1)  On September 9th, 2001, it has been revealed that Beltelecom systematically and 
officially blocked access to several political websites, making use of the, so-called 
Internet Service Provider’s (ISP) network router, to censor information and 
communications. As a result, numerous other websites became unreachable and 
particular users (hackers) created “mirror” domains to allow citizens to reach the 
information available on those sites. 
This is a proof that, despite governmental efforts, Belarusian citizens still used 
internet as an alternative channel to access information and communicate in and 
outside the country’s territory with other users and to express opinions and 
alternative views. Analysts and academics have used such proof as an indication that 
change might be possible in Belarus and that there is potential in the EU-Eastern 
partnership (Bosse et al, 2009).
 
2)  On January 20th, 2004, the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacked the 
Belarusian cyber-space to locate various offensive websites, including networks 
associated with international crime and, i.e. trade of pornographic material, as well 
as activities taking place outside the country’s borders. The DDoS compromised 
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more than 55.000 IP addresses, in a course of three weeks and, allegedly, accused 
persons for their involvement in trading child pornography or threatening the cyber-
security of the country, with little or no proof at all. Many researchers criticized these 
actions as an attempt to abuse power in order to minimize opposition (Zhang et al, 
2012).
 
3)  On April 26th, 2008, several street protests took place in the capital of the country, 
with the citizens accusing the government for the lack of appropriate protection of 
their rights and data in online / digital spaces. That same day, the DDoS attacked 
open radio stations in the countries with attacks coming from computers outside the 
country, indicatively the Middle East and Asia. The size of the attack and the 
apparent lack of counter-mechanisms on behalf of the country to deal with the 
offenses effectively, revealed that the government was neither able or prepared to 
safeguard the sensitive data of the people and the companies operating in the country. 
4)   On the other hand, the, so-called “97 Charter”, a pro-democratic website operating 
in Belarus with an aim to promote freedom of communication and expression 
("Charter'97, n.d.), has managed to effectively counter a DDoS attack on it during 
June 8th, 2009 that took place during a tented period for the Russian-Belarusian 
relations. The technical staff of the Charter ‘97 neutralized the attack and proposed 
the “Free Internet” project to sufficiently tackle similar offences in the future 
("Charter'97, n.d.).
 
 
3.3 Saudi Arabia 
 Cyber-threat and cyber-terrorism are problems faced not only by non-Muslim 
countries, as many assume. On the contrary, all countries, regardless of their political or 
administrative systems are potential targets of terrorist organizations and transnational criminal 
organizations. As a note, here, it must be then, added, that the theory of realism in international 
relation already clarifies that all nation States act as rational “players” in the international 
system and aim to promote their interests in order to maximize security and minimize exposure 
to risk. Therefore, it has to be made clear that, in any case, terrorism may use religion and 
ideology as “causes” but, in fact, their aims expand much further beyond those areas (Solansky 
et al, 2009).
 
Following the same pattern for the second case study, in this paper, as in the first 
(Belarus), when it comes to the country profile (Central Intelligence Agency, 2018):
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-    Saudi Arabia is not a liberal democracy. On the contrary, the country is governed 
by the male descendants of the Saudi (and Kuwait) royal family. 
-     The official religion of the country is Islam and the country follows the religious 
law, despite the fact that, during 2015, King Abdallah has made considerable efforts 
to modernize the legal and administrative system of Saudi Arabia. 
-    The country is one of the global leaders in the energy market, being very rich in 
resources. 
-     Also, it has a considerably high GDP per capita and is considered as a centre for 
business activity. 
When it comes to indicative examples that can be included, in this part of the paper, to 
Geers (2011):
 
-     The Saudi government uses arguments such as the need to protect the morality, the 
culture and social wellbeing of the citizens to justify the imposition of a firewall 
that forbids all users nation-wide to access websites that are considered to be 
potentially threatening to the interests of the state. 
-     The firewall bans the access of users to Internet Service Providers (ISPs), disrupts 
communications, monitors users’ activity, censors material, forbids chatting and the 
distribution of pornography. 
-     Some partial progress has taken place since 1994, with the opening of the internet 
to websites that are not purely used for academic or research purposes. 
-    Even mail and transactions are monitored by the KACST, an institution that acts 
much like a national digital post-office, and even has access to passwords, personal 
data and communications, to fully control all users’ activities. 
-  The KACST also uses an elaborate content-filtering system to apply a strict 
framework to locate potentially threatening content, such as offensive words and 
expressions. 
-      The Saudi government, when allowing the connection of the public to the internet 
in 1999, also created the “Secure Computing’s software” that is called “SmartFilter” 
and is used to block more than twenty thousand (20.000) popular websites, 
including sites that are associated with pornography, gambling and online chat. 
  
 For the Saudi government, then, the following comments have to be made: 
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-          the ideology and religion cannot be put aside. On the contrary, the country is 
administered using a rather “mixed system”: on the one hand, male citizens are 
being granted a wide number of rights, and, on the other, there is an active firewall 
that exists and blocks “inappropriate” content and websites anywhere within the 
borders of the country (Geers, 2011).
 
-          As a consequence, there is only partial freedom of expression and there is need 
for further liberalization and democratization of the country’s institutions in order 
to protect the cyberspace and personal data of citizens. For the country, additionally, 
since it is one of the most competitive environments for the creation and expansion 
of multinational companies, activities and cooperation, it has to be made sure that 
-          Since Saudi Arabia borders countries in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East 
that face multiple crises, it has become one of the most active leaders of a 34-nation 
Islamic Coalition that was created in 2015, to tackle problems related to terrorism. 
Nowadays (June 2018), the Coalition includes 41 nations. Also, the country, since 
2017, is part of the Global Center for Combatting Extremist Ideology (Etidal) 
following the initiative of King Salman that aims at reducing gender bias and has 
granted additional rights to women. These strategies have led to a further 
liberalization of the country. 
-          Saudi authorities distinguish between “passive” and “active” threats on their 
cyber-security. In particular, as “passive” they characterize propaganda and 
sabotage and as “active” terrorist and criminal activities. What is to be noted is that 
the county, since the 2013-2016 “heated” period of constant attacks, has managed 
to update its system and increasingly uses “soft power” to minimize threat (Madhian 
and Majed, 2017).
 
 
3.4 Israel 
Again, using the information of the CIA World Factbook (Central Intelligence Agency, 
2018), the following information can be included to create a short and comprehensive country 
profile for Israel:
 
-          Israel, in its short history, has been part of several armed conflicts with 
neighboring countries such as Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1994) as well as the 
notorious conflict with Palestine, leading to severe loss of lives and wellbeing for 
the citizens. 
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-          Israel owns important resources, making it a competitive actor in the international 
market and retains, therefore, despite the various problems related to under-
productivity and low workforce, a rather important position in the international 
markets. 
-          Also, it is a regional power with one of the most equipped armies, applying a 
system of mandatory service in the army for all male and female adults, regardless 
of religion. 
 Coming, now, to an analysis of past, present and future threats for Israel, when it comes 
to cybersecurity: 
-          Israel is a country that has been created in the middle of the 20th c. in the aftermath 
of the second world war and has been widely accused of defying international law 
and using official state’s propaganda to promote the national interests of the state. 
In particular, the international attention has been turned on the country, particularly 
to discuss how and why the country tries to censor material and to use its public 
diplomacy by supporting websites that use hate speech and offensive content to 
“win” the war against Palestine in Gaza. This means that Israel is both a target and 
an offender and special attention must be given in the analysis when it comes to this 
country (Saad, Bazan and Varin, 2011).
 
-          Notably, two major attacks against the Israeli cyber-space have to be highlighted: 
the first regards an attack coming from various sides, located in the US, in 2016, 
targeting Israeli hospitals. Four hospitals have been attacked and important data 
have been exposed (Kuperwasser, 2017). According to reports of the Reuters, in 
2018, there have been several efforts of international criminal and terrorist 
organizations to target the Israeli bank system. Among those, there have been cases 
of fishing, fraud and systematic attacks to the overall administrative and financial 
system of Israel, that aimed at proving the country’s inability to protect its 
cyberspace, and, at the same time, lead to economic profit for the penetrators 
("Cyber attacks on Israeli banks rose in last six months", 2018).
 
-          Israel is one of the main targets of Hezbollah, a terrorist organization that openly 
declares as one of its main goals the destruction of the country. This means that 
there is high probability for it to become a key target of several individuals or groups 
of individuals or sister-organizations to Hezbollah. This entails a risk for the 
stability of the whole Middle East and, even, the international system itself. After 
all, the Israeli government has been allegedly linked with lobbies and elite parties 
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acting abroad such as in the USA, Canada, Australia, Germany and the UK. This 
means that the small country can, actually, disrupt the regional balance and, 
regardless of the outcome of a potential large-scale crisis, a power vacuum in the 
Middle East with unmeasurable consequences, will be created (Saad et al., 2011).
 
-          The Israeli mass media are not completely uncensored or free. On the contrary, 
there have been allegations of the country using social and digital media to promote 
ideas related to Israeli revisionism, religious fundamentalism and motivation to hate 
(hate speech) against the Palestinian people. This means that the government, itself 
is, officially, accused for abusing the internet to manipulate public opinion and 
change perspectives for their own benefit (El Zein and Abusalem, 2015).
 
-      “Op-Israel” is one of the most notorious examples of systematic attacks aimed 
at the cyberspace of a particular country and is not led by any particular group or 
individual. A massive attack took place during April 7th, 2013, at the same day that 
the world celebrated the Holocaust Remembrance Day, to target all types of state-
monitored and administered websites, including educational, medical and 
commercial databases. This attack has been linked to the organization 
“Anonymous” but was supported by various groups at a global level. The 
government was warned before and there has been no physical damage. However, 
the attack has managed to disrupt the system of administration in Israel, caused 
public unrest and led to massive delays ("Anonymous launches massive cyber 
assault on Israel", 2013).
 
Responsible for the protection of the Israeli cyber-space is the state itself. In particular, 
Israel has prioritized cyber-security, recognizing the ever-evolving nature of the internet and 
the communications system. the main priorities of the country include (Kuperwasser, 2017):
 
-   Limit the online propaganda used by terrorist through locating offensive content 
published on social media, particularly Twitter and Facebook. 
-   Use a wide variety of methods and mechanisms to further secure the national 
cyberspaces. 
-   Monitor the “jihadi chatters” and blogs to achieve an early prevention and 
countering of potential threats. 
-    Locate terrorists and potential offenders by systematically locating uses of specific 
vocabulary, and symbols and, then, identifying the user, using his or her IP to 
successfully prevent a terrorist act. 
-    Inform the public and disseminate information on cyber-security. 
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-   Co-operate with other countries to further enhance protection. 
-     Use a robotic system to protect critical infrastructure and databases. 
 
3.5 Comments and remarks 
 Having completed the analysis on the regulatory framework across the so-called 
“West” to tackle, repress and reduce cyber-attacks and cyber-terrorism, it has been made clear 
that, complex as it is, the problem of expansibility and constant magnification of international 
criminal networks that aim at terrorizing the public and disrupting public order, requires equally 
flexible and successful counter-measures. Particularly, it appears that international 
organizations such as the EU or NATO, are more competent to act against terrorist groups and 
threat of all types, including cyber- ones. This happens due to the fact that the member States 
are able to exchange know – how, infrastructure and technologies and increase their capabilities 
and defense against internal and external threat (Liang, 2015).
 
On the other hand, though, the researcher has also highlighted that, in several cases, it 
is required on behalf of specific nation States to take individual actions to protect their cyber-
spaces. National databases, the personal data of citizens, the balance sheets of multinational 
companies as well as strategic plans and sensitive data, are among the most vulnerable types 
of information that the countries should be able to safeguard. Otherwise, the impact on the 
States will be major, with them experiencing a loss of status, power and credibility at an 
international level. Even worse, terrorist and criminal organizations can take advantage of the 
information they gain access to, to threaten the lives and wellbeing of the citizens and the 
function of the institutions. Most commonly, even if an attack is not specifically “terrorist”, 
criminals, at an individual level or as part of groups, may sell the data to third parties and, 
therefore, the attacks can come from multiple sides and have similar outcomes (Ariely, 2007).
 
Through an elaborate discussion of the data and material related to the above, the 
following must be highlighted: 
-     The countries that have been studied still retain the ideology the governments used 
during the Cold War. This means that emphasis is given on foreclosure, retaliation 
and active protection. Thus, in several occasions, there have been minor or major 
violations of the international law at an official level to protect public safety and 
security (Hennesy, 2003).
 
-    At the same time though, all those cases indicate that the countries seek to advance 
their technological systems and secure their cyber-spaces, realizing that the new 
types of threats, that include cyber-attacks, need a targeted intervention. This 
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includes constant training of staff, exchange of knowledge and expertise and 
cooperation with third countries (Posen, 2002).
 
-    The priorities of the governments must and do include initiatives to plan counter-
measures, coordinate actions, informing the public, doing forensic research, screen 
and search the cases and, engage at a systematic research to achieve maximum 
capability, adaptability and flexibility, as well as to intervene before the attack takes 
place (FEMA, 2016).
 
-   Countering cyber-terrorism can become a complex political issue. Especially in 
non-liberal countries, ideology is used to promote stability and impose rule. 
Therefore, it must be made certain that the government does not suffer a loss of 
power as a consequence. 
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4. Supranational Paradigms 
4.1 Introduction 
The modern state, apart from the apparent problems with regard to the protection of its 
citizens against the infinite, uncontrollable internet, has more challenges to face in the present 
time of rising Islamophobia and due to the overall crisis, a crisis that does not only have to do 
with financial instabilities but is far deeper- a crisis of democracy and values. All those set an 
additional barrier in the efforts of protecting people and, especially, the country’s wellbeing 
against all forms of cyber-crime (Marini, 2015). Some countries, such as the member States of 
the European Union, have tried to regulate their legislation and the treatment of cybercrime 
through a development of specific codes of conducts, setting strict framework with specific 
provisions against offences and defining terms widely used to describe crimes that take place 
in the digital environment, such as that of “cyber terrorism”. However, the situation is 
particularly complex and, as such, so are the challenges that emerge in the process. The fact 
that efforts at a national level are unsystematic and lack strategic planning in combination with 
the other, most significant problem, of the impossibility of tackling cybercrime individually 
but only through tight international cooperation, further justify why the actions have no 
significant output. At the same time, increased awareness of the risks associated to the lack of 
cybersecurity and the wide of the internet raise public concern on the violation of, interestingly, 
not only their individual rights offended when offences occur but also about fact that, as part 
of the efforts of the state to protect them, their fundamental civil rights, such as that of freedom 
of expression are violated (Capon, 2015). 
Ironically, despite prioritizing the tackling of cybercrime and systematizing efforts 
towards it, no universal definition of the term exists. Generally, academics tend to use various 
definitions- others too brief and others too extent. Of course, in the process of designing and 
implementing a specific strategy on behalf of States at either national or regional or 
international level, specific descriptions and explanations as to what each act covers does 
provide with an overall idea of how the term was conceptualized and on what it concerns. In 
that way, these descriptions can potentially be used, however, technically, the lack of a common 
international agreement acts as an additional barrier to the effective protection of what we call 
“cyberspace” in an adequate way (Kshetri, 2010). 
Especially when it comes to particularly “sensitive” issues that involve issues such as 
hate speech and hate crime which require a specific politically incentive and include policy 
challenges that may reflect on the projection of a particular profile of a candidate and/of a party, 
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the situation become even more complex. In that respect, there is an observable unwillingness 
of leaders to engage in a systematic process to define, legislate, enact and apply strict rules and 
regulate offenses which could potentially threaten their public image or their relationship to 
elites (including lobbying) (Dodge & Kitchin, 2001). For instance, even in the same country 
and among US States, laws on cybercrime are applied to various degrees and citizens 
themselves as well as Institutions choose to respond in different ways to different challenges 
depending on the particular culture, traditions and priorities of each state. An indicative 
example can be drawn through investigating how “hate speech” and “harassment” in the 
internet is treated: California, as a state with a more “progressive” overall governance and 
culture applies strict rules and includes categories such as gender and sexuality ("U.S. hate-
crimes bills/laws California law (Bill SB 1234)", n.d.) while others such Texas and, generally, 
the American South, having a certain past of bias and prejudice, are more inflexible and hesitant 
towards taking more effective action. This is a very complex political issue itself, as, as it can 
be realized, any politician who would like to go as candidate in a Southern state will take into 
account their “audience” (electoral base) and prioritize electoral success. As a result, they will 
try to avoid touching upon sensitive issues such as treatment of minorities and strict punishment 
against racist rhetoric (Carr, 2012). 
One can only imagine what happens in international levels. To begin with, cyberspace 
is part of the ever-changing, constantly evolving digital environment that is the projection of 
the globalized society which is trying to discover new ways to incorporate external elements 
of different societies to be able to approach old notions in new manners. The very ideas and 
logic behind previously “fixed” terms such as “citizenship” and the very boundaries of the 
state, even the concept of what is the state, are contested in the cyberspace (Capello & 
Dentinho, 2012). OSCE further points out the complexity of the issues around the protection 
of cyberspace activities and defense against offenses and violations. In particular, clear mention 
is given on the risks related to the lack of common agreements and understanding between the 
States, a problem that further leads in miscalculations, administrative and operational 
incapabilities and hasten inter-state relations. The citizen is also particularly vulnerable in that 
process while lack of a common approach and defense strategy with clear calculations, 
common perceptions and co-operation at all levels can effect transnational relationships and 
create inter-state tensions (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2016). 
In that global, border-free, infinite, fictional “space” of the “cyberspace” human and 
civil rights are constantly threatened as, in reality, the human factor is always there and always 
absent (European Parliament, 2015). Because if the cyberspace is not a space then what is it? 
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The user, is immediately assumed to be a “human” being, but, is that always so? Hidden behind 
their anonymity, users can be both invisible and extremely apparent. Yet, it is important to take 
actions to protect that anonymity since it gives the internet its full potential- it allows for free 
speech and expression, accessibility and serve of a particular informative purpose 
(Kittichaisaree, 2017). That way, it is the responsibility of the State to take actual measures to 
protect the user’s anonymity and the user from threats deriving by anonymity. As argued, this 
is impossible to be accomplished through isolated national initiative and requires multi-level 
international cooperation (Khosrowpour, 2000). This section will analyze exactly how, to what 
extend and through the use of which tools, regional and international organizations such as 
NATO, the EU and the UN act towards managing the effective defense of their Member-States’ 
cyberspace. 
 
4.2 United Nations 
One of the first United Nation bodies to address the cyber domain was ECOSOC. In its 
first steps the committee’s belief was that cybersecurity and cybercrime should be tackled 
through a close co-operation between the private and public sector including the participation 
of stakeholders who represent the civil society to achieve development through cooperation, 
training and awareness-raising. Also, ECOSOC identified several parameters that make 
cybersecurity a complex matter, including the need for a constant, rapid and immediate law 
enforcement, the role of economic inequalities and the lack of a coherent, commonly agreed 
strategy to prevent cybercriminal and to assist countries to create, as they called it “safe 
heavens” for developing countries. Especially in the area of protecting children against online 
crime, Ms. Deborah Taylor Tate, ITU Special Envoy and Laureate for Child Online Protection, 
made specific recommendations with regard to the need for applying a common strategy to 
provide children with the necessary tools, media literacy and protection to be able to safely join 
the “online world” ("Cybersecurity: A global issue demanding a global approach", 2011). 
 Despite their tendency to avoid actions on issues regarding “high politics” especially 
due to the need for a consensus and as they tend to “leave” such matters to the Security Council 
which has a more “military” scope than the majority of their organs, many UN Organizations 
have, actually, taken initiative in drafting, assisting in, educating about and enforcing 
regulations and mechanisms with regard to the protection of cyberspace. As a result, in their 
majority, the United Nations’ activities in the field are fragmented and usually need to be 
approved by the General Assembly (UNGA) or the Security Council (SC). Especially the SC 
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has not yet passed any mandatory agreement on protecting the cyberspace of the UN member 
States (Maurer, 2011). 
As a matter of fact: 
● United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) managed to raise awareness 
on cybersecurity through the organization of a Special Event on “Cybersecurity and 
Development in collaboration with the Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
(DESA) and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) which gained 
significant attention due to it bringing together public and private sector organizations 
operating in several member States and the civil society. In collaboration with other 
UN organs it was successful in raising awareness, identifying best practices and talk 
about the future of cybercrime ("Informal Summary of the Special Event on 
Cybersecurity and Development", 2011).  
● Despite the lack of binding resolutions, draft resolutions on cyber-defense have been 
passed to the UNGA for voting by the Disarmament and International Security 
Committee (First Committee), the Economic and Financial Committee (Second 
Committee) and the Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee (Third Committee). 
● the First Committee, and, in particular, actors such as U.S., China and Russia have 
pushed towards the discussions on ‘high end’ of information security threats from 1998 
onwards with actions such as the 2001 Resolution, that regarded the Russian proposal 
for the establishment of a specialized group of experts on governmental level. The 
group would include 15 experts from various States, chosen on the basis of their 
geographic position and would aim at a study to of threats in cyber-security and was 
called “GGE”. The plan was rejected (Tikk, 2012). The GGE and its creation was 
proposed again in 2009 that resulted at a consensus report and agreeing on future 
cooperation and coordination, followed by the calling of a third GGE in 2011 with 
similar outcomes that further affirmed the need for application of international 
standards and law regarding the cyberspace, which was also followed by a fourth one 
which finished its tasks in 2015. 
● The Second Committee made numerous efforts towards “pushing” the ‘creation of a 
global culture of cybersecurity’. Theses led to the adoption of resolution 57/239 by the 
UNGA in 2003. The resolution aims at regulating and advancing the national 
information technology and its functions and includes nine (9) priority-areas: 
1. Awareness 
2. Responsibility 
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3. Response 
4. Ethics 
5. Democracy 
6. Risk assessment 
7. Security design and implementation 
8. Security management 
9. Reassessment (UNGA Resolution 57/239, 2003). 
● The Third Committee of the GA focuses mainly on privacy rights, which proposed 
measures to tackle cybercrime with respect to privacy and people’s rights, with two 
draft proposals leading to the adoption, for instance, of resolution 68/168 on ‘The right 
to privacy in the digital age’ (European Cyber Security Perspectives, 2015) and 
appointance of a new Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy.  
● The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) also takes initiatives on cybercrime and 
on ac common international response and has produced, among many, a report on 
cyber-related research and initiatives ("Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime", 2013). 
The United Nations have made efforts for cybersecurity actions, however, we observe that 
even though they started very active and energetic, they went through a period were the UN 
didn’t take any cyberspace initiative, and after that we go through a period where the UN is 
starting again to peak their efforts. This lack of continuity, as well as the lack of the lack of 
proper committees and bodies to tackle those issues have prevented the United Nations of 
achieving a major breakthrough regarding the cyber domain.  
Concluding, the author agrees with the opinion of Chainoglou (2013, 204) that “the 
development of any new body of law to address computer network attacks should be a matter 
for negotiation within the United Nations following a rigorous assessment of state practice in 
the field of cyber warfare". 
 
4.3 European Union 
 According to the official website of the Consilium, the EU has designed and has 
encouraged its member States to implement a specific “security strategy” to protect the States’ 
and European (in general) telecommunications systems. The proposed strategy includes setting 
provision to enable a timely response to prevention against disruptions and attacks at the 
cyberspace. The digital agenda includes the protection of IT systems, of search engines and 
digital platforms, databases and business’ information systems (including online payment 
services) and risk management ("Reform of cybersecurity in Europe", n.d.). 
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Cyber-security is also part of the EU efforts to ensure financial stability as it protects 
the online economy and its function and ensure the implementation of the common 
international strategy against cybercrime. The main aims, as specified, are to: 
o increase cybersecurity and network security of the member States by 
implementing the NIS Directive. 
o strengthen overall impact and capacities of the EU in the field of providing 
citizens, companies (SMEs included), the public rector etc. advantages and 
protection of rights (such as the right to privacy). 
o mainstreaming the main aspirations and strategies (as well as best practices) of 
the Union and emphasize on the Internet of Things (IoT). 
▪ develop public-private partnership while tackling problems and risks related to 
cybersecurity through the NIS Platform (networking). 
▪ further engage in international activities such as working with the EU-US Working 
Group on Cybersecurity and Cybercrime, 
▪ cooperate with:  
− the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),  
− the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA),  
− the International Telecommunication Union (ITU),  
− the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE),  
▪ join the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), 
▪ take part in the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) ("Cybersecurity", n.d.).  
The European Union has taken significant steps to set up the proper bodies and frameworks 
for cybersecurity. It has provided its Member-States with a plethora of tools but we observe 
that the states have huge differences among themselves when it comes to cyber awareness and 
cyber preparedness. 
 
4.4 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
 Further systematic strategic planning on combating cyber-threat has been done at 
regional level through the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, for its 57 
member States. Their overall strategy, contrary to other similar initiatives such as that of the 
EU, is more crime-oriented, specifying and clearly stating that their aim is to tackle 
“cybercrimes and the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes” through creating tools and 
mechanisms such as the CBMs (Confidence Building Measures) ("Cyber/ICT Security", n.d.).  
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 In detail, the main activities of the OSCE in establishing sufficient and suitable 
measures that would use international high standards in combating cybercrime and cyber-threat 
include: 
− the implementation of “Decision No. 1202 on OSCE confidence-building measures 
(CBMs) to reduce the risks of conflict stemming from the use of information and 
communication technologies (ICTs)” (2016) which regulates: 
o Information sharing and exchange 
o Communication and dialogue 
o Future arrangements and things to consider 
o International and regional co-operation. 
− the operation of a separate department specialized in ICT/cyber security. For OSCE, 
ICT (Information Communication Technologies) and the reduction of risks from their 
use for the participating States and their citizens, is one of the key priorities to achieve 
communication and cooperation as well as economic and social advancement and 
growth (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2016). 
− working close with other regional and international organization. For example, it 
maintains networks of communication with:  
− the Council of Europe (CoE) in a Joint Expert Workshop in applying Council Decision 
no. 3/04 on “Combating the Use of the Internet and with regard to the “Convention on 
the Prevention of Terrorism” ("Responses to cyber terrorism", 2008). 
− networking and common actions with other organs of the United Nations in order to 
achieve a better countering of terrorism (especially) and to incorporate other sections 
and sectors in a common strategic approach, as through co-operation with the Security 
Council of the UN with regard to the application of Regulation 1373 of 2001 and 
through the Action Against Terrorism Unit (ATU) within the Office on Drug and Crime 
of the UN (UNODC) (Tehrani, 2017). 
− NATO, especially when it comes to cyber-attacks on particular member States’ 
domains such as Estonia, and on relations with Russia and Ukraine (Tikk, 2010). 
The prosperity that Europe has seen the last decades has almost eliminated the need for the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Without its core objectives being 
relevant anymore, OSCE has tried to reaffirm its mandate, pivoting to other areas of interest 
where the organization might be able to have a purpose once again. Whether this pivot will 
prove successful, remains to be seen.  
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4.5 Council of Europe 
 Further elaborating on regional efforts to tackle cybercrime, the Council of Europe 
(CoE) is one of the most active in not just drafting but actually enforcing acts and measures on 
tackling online threats. CoE follows the Common Standards set by the Budapest Convention 
on Cybercrime (2001) which aims to: 
- align national and international efforts against cybercrime and cyberterrorism, 
- improve existing techniques, mechanisms and methodologies,  
- increase transnational cooperation,  
- enhance the protection of the sovereignty of the member States, 
- set up an applicable standard method of immediately tackling threat. 
In addition, CoE, just like the OSCE and the EU, aims for the inclusion of further States 
despite them being or not its members, such as with the recent accession of Chile to the 
Convention (2017) or the collaboration with the United States of America (USA) in the project 
Cybercrime@Octopus (2017) initiatives that enhance international cooperation and a more 
coherent and targeted approach.  
CoE also organizes and fully supports missions and activities, as well as funds specific 
projects in a variety of domains and regions with a focus on cybercrime, namely, and not 
exclusively:  
- visits in countries in and outside Europe to promote the Budapest Convention and 
Cybercrime Convention Committee (T-CY), that have measurable effects on 
creating solid networks of cooperation and encouraging voluntary participation. 
- the aforementioned Cybercrime@Octopus project, which also included, apart from 
the States that took part, Microsoft, 
- iPROCEEDS a Joint project of the European Union which includes countries that 
are in a pre-accession phase and aim at a full EU membership, 
- Eastern Partnership projects (Eastern Europe) like Cybercrime@EAP II and 
Cybercrime@EAP, 
- the Global Action on Cybercrime (GLACY+). 
The Council of Europe is yet another organization that seeks to reaffirm its mandate 
and that is the core driver for its cybersecurity involvement. However, the Budapest 
Convention on Cybercrime (2001) is one of the leading international documents that deals with 
this issue. 
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4.6 North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NATO is admittedly the most active in the field of cyber defense- first of all, collective 
defense against cyber-attacks is declared as one of its core tasks and also holds itself 
responsible for the protection of both its own networks and on assisting its member States in 
reinforcing their capabilities with regard to the protection of their own, national networks, in 
ways compatible with the methods introduced and used by NATO and with each other. Apart 
from practical methods of protection of the cyberspace against offenders and crime, the allies 
are also supported by NATO in further advancing with education, training, prevention and 
mutual assistance with regard to managing and protecting their cyberspace. NATO, as 
discussed, maintains vital and active networks of cooperation with other international and 
regional organization such as the CoE and the EU, recognizing the need for a common 
approach.  Apart from that, specific mention is given to public-private cooperation and the need 
to include major enterprises ("Cyber defence", 2018).  
That strategic focus is justified by the increased risks for the member States with regard 
to their military security, sovereignty and the need to tackle cybercrime in all its forms as a top 
priority issue that moves beyond the private domain (protection of intellectual rights and of 
personal data) which are commonly addressed by the EU (hard politics instead of soft politics). 
NATO has, indeed, moved towards a more “aggressive” response to what they call a “cyber-
crisis” and tries to tackle the problems in their very roots as the Alliance considers cyber threat 
as a threat to the NATO itself and its function and operations (Fidler, Pregent & Vandurme, 
2016). 
NATO efforts on cyber security started as early as in 1999, before the majority of 
organizations began to even consider the potential importance and extent of the need for 
protection against “digital offences” but it was only after 2007 that it systematized its actions, 
due to attacks in Estonia that caused increased national and international concern on the 
vulnerability of the national information systems (Fidler et al., 2016). Since then, NATO 
continues to take over a variety of actions against cybercrime and provides with all sorts of 
measures- from training to information sharing, to military defense, storing of information etc 
(Healey & van Bochoven, 2011). The main policy areas are: 
- the NATO Policy on Cyber Defence, endorsed in 2014, that aims to integrate an 
operational plan to increase awareness and training on processes with regard to 
cooperation and defense against cyber-attacks, including civil emergency strategic 
planning and prioritizing the safeguarding of communications systems’ systems. The 
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Strategy is indicative of the main purposes of the Alliance and emphasizes on 
international cooperation, including state-enterprise common approaches.  
- development of the allies’ cyber defense capability through the NATO Computer 
Incident Response Capability (NCIRC), which is part of the Alliance’s Smart Defence 
projects and includes exchange of information and of best practices among its member 
States.  
- Increasing cyber defense capacities with further training of citizens on education, 
regular projects such as the Cyber Coalition Exercise, awareness-raising activities, the 
drafting of MOU (Memorandum of Understanding on Cyber Defence, consultation 
through common initiatives such as the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of 
Excellence (CCD CoE) and the NATO Communications and Information Systems 
School (NCISS) etc.  
- Systematic cooperation with partners towards a common border defense to strengthen 
the works of the alliance and enhancing security on the basis of a common approach 
that reflects the mutual interests of the stakeholders. 
- Cooperation with the private sector and industry to achieve cyber defense, especially 
with the NATO Industry Cyber Partnership (NIC), including Computer Emergency 
Response Teams (CERTs) in national levels and multinational Smart Defense Projects 
that involve industries ("Cyber defence", 2018).  
NATO has been a pioneer regarding the level of involvement it has shown with the cyber 
domain. However, even though NATO is providing its Member-States with all the necessary 
information and training in order to adapt to the new challenges, it is observed that the level of 
cyber awareness is not harmonized with the alliance, as is the case with the European Union. 
The author expects that especially due to the interconnection of systems and the ever 
increasing use of the cyber domain, NATO will push its members to adapt to those challenges. 
Otherwise security flaws in the infrastructure of Members-States, in addition to non-
harmonized frameworks will significantly jeopardize the alliance’s capabilities. 
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5. Conclusions 
In the modern era cyberspace is going to become, sooner rather than later,  the primary 
battlefield. The vulnerability of the internet, the reactive nature of cyber defense, the 
participation of non-state actors and the plausible deniability paint the modern strategic cyber 
landscape. As Geers (2014) notes “Nations today use computer network operations to defend 
sovereignty and to project power, and cyber conflicts may soon become the rule rather than the 
exception.”. 
States are, and will remain for the foreseeable future, the main actors responsible for 
countering those threats and providing a safer internet for their citizens. In order to do so, state 
institutions must adapt more swiftly to this new reality. 
This dissertation examines the evolution of the concepts of sovereignty and national 
interest in cyberspace. Regarding the concept of sovereignty, we have seen that researchers 
have started to study the issue, especially after the publication of the Tallinn Manual 2.0. States 
start to include the cyber domain in their core documents, which signals a shift in traditional 
strategic thinking. 
Regarding the concept of the national interest, there is hardly any literature, which 
means that there is an opportunity for a more in-depth research, regarding the traditional 
concept of national interest and how it is projected and protected on the cyber domain. 
In the third chapter, the author has used the cases of Belarus, Saudi Arabia and Israel 
to show how sovereign States dealt with cyber issues threatening their sovereignty and national 
interests.  
 Finally, in the last chapter, this thesis examined how supranational organizations are 
actively involved in assisting their member States to develop the cyber capabilities they need. 
Furthermore, these organizations are actively pursuing the development of frameworks and the 
establishment of bodies within the organizations that tackle cyber issues. 
 The overlapping field between cyber space and international relations will become a 
major field of research in the coming years per this dissertation’s conclusions. 
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